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This paper examines what set of familial circumstances allow for the justifiable 
interference with the right to respect for family life under Article 8, echr. We analyse 
all the Courts’ judgments on adoptions from care to find out what the Court means 
by a “family unit” and the “child´s best interest”. Our analysis show that the status and 
respect of the child’s de facto family life is changing. This resonates with a view that 
children do not only have formal rights, but that they are recognised as individuals 
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within the family unit that states and courts must address directly. Family is both 
biological parents and child relationships, as well between children and foster parents, 
and to a more limited extent between siblings themselves. The Court’s understanding 
of family is in line with the theoretical literature, wherein the concept of family reflects 
the bonds created by personal, caring relationships and activities.
Keywords 
children’s rights – European Court of Human Rights – adoption – right to respect for 
family life
1 Introduction
Roald Dahl’s famous novel Matilda (1988), about the five-year-old Matilda who 
is neglected by her family and does not fit into her birth family’s culture and 
preferences, has an interesting teaching line. The story ends with Matilda initi-
ating adoption proceedings, so that she can change family, and that the lovely 
Miss Honey adopts Matilda and becomes her parent. Roald Dahl is revolution-
ary in his approach to family, with Matilda making a choice to select a new 
family, and at that time, that an unmarried woman would be allowed to adopt 
a child and be considered a family. In this paper we examine what set of famil-
ial circumstances allow for the justifiable interference with the right to respect 
for family life.
Societies have long accepted – morally, legally and politically – that par-
ents can give up their children to be raised by others, so that de facto respon-
sibility for a child is transferred from the birth parent(s)’ family to another 
adult(s). Often it is family members that care for these children, and without 
the State or anyone else being involved in transferring authority over chil-
dren. The reasons for this practice have been circumstances such as poverty, 
health issues, moral shame (e.g. for children born out of wedlock), or work 
obligations (e.g. women and men leaving their children with others to work 
in other countries for years). Societies accept that children can be adopted by 
others so that de facto and de jure responsibility for the child are transferred 
from birth parents to other(s).1 The parents’ freedom and authority to give up 
1 For a comprehensive historical account of adoption, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 
“Waiting for Loving: The Child’s Fundamental Right to Adoption”, 34 Capital University Law 
Review, 297–329, 309–316. We have limited information about step-parent adoptions.
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their child for adoption is, in most European countries, a simple procedure 
demanding consent from parents with parental rights and from the child (con-
sent competency is set to a fixed age from ten years and older in the majority 
of the European countries (N = 30)) (Fenton-Glynn, 2013: 594–5). Irrespective 
of whether the transfer of care is temporary or permanent, de facto or de jure, 
children have hardly been heard in these situations. The cultural acceptance 
of adoptions probably varies, as indicated by the fact that this only rarely hap-
pens in some countries and more often in others; and some countries have 
even made adoptions a topic for their tv shows, for instance, “16 and pregnant” 
(US) and “Find me a family” (UK).
However, when the State interferes with parents’ freedom and authority 
in child protection situations, for instance by limiting or terminating paren-
tal rights due to the interests of the child, controversies on moral, political 
and legal grounds are raised. The State has an obligation to protect the rights 
of the child and must intervene if there is evidenced abuse or neglect of a 
child (Gilbert et al., 2011; Kilkelly, 2017; Burns et al., 2017). The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc), ratified by all States in the world 
except the USA, prohibits the involuntary separation of children from their 
parents unless such separation is deemed necessary for the best interests of 
the child (Article 9(1)). Although the crc does not contain a specific right to 
respect for family life, it is strongly premised on the view that the child’s rights 
are best secured in the context of family life.2
In Europe, there are millions of children that have been removed from their 
parents due to abuse and neglect, and if not adopted, many of them will live 
most of their childhood in public care (Burns et al., 2017; Berrick, Gilbert and 
Skivenes, in press). Parents in all European states can bring their case before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) if they believe their 
human rights have been violated by the state. Children have the same right, as 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr or Convention) 
extends the right contained in the Convention to “everyone”. Cases studied 
in this article have been initiated by parents, although cases about violations 
of family rights will typically also involve children. Nevertheless, it has been 
noted that the child’s perspective in these judgments is often virtually invisi-
ble and the practice of the Court focuses on the rights of the parents instead 
of those of the child (Kilkelly and Bracken, 2017). The sole purpose of the 
2 Articles 5, 9–11, 18(1) and (2), 20–21, 25 and 27(4) are the rights that are particularly pertinent to 
the child’s right to respect for family life, with Articles 9, 20 and 21 being particularly relevant 
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ECtHR is to interpret the echr and to analyse whether national practice by 
State Parties complies with it. The central aim of the Court is to develop prin-
ciples that could be embedded in the national legal system (Spano, 2018). As 
such, the jurisdiction of the Court is subsidiary to that of the member states, 
which in Article 8 cases means that the states have wide discretion in planning 
and executing their policies on family and child. The Court does not interfere 
unless clear procedural mistakes have been made, or core elements of the right 
to respect for family life have been violated (cf. Asche 2017, ECtHR 2019). The 
ECtHR is authoritative in its interpretation of human rights, and its decisions 
have an impact on member states’ practice (Zysset, 2018: 94–96). Thus, it is 
of vital importance to examine how the Court approaches and understands 
the child’s family relations, and if the Court acknowledges children’s right to 
respect for family life.
In this paper, we study how a child’s right to respect for family life and 
the child’s right to have her best interests considered, are understood and 
interpreted for children who are in public care with no prospect of being 
reunified with their birth parents. Our research focuses on adoptions that 
stem from placement of children into public care, and the subsequent deci-
sion to place children for adoption that is resisted by the birth family, and 
thus is “involuntary”. The empirical material for our analysis consists of all 
cases concerning contested adoptions from care which have been decided by 
the ECtHR in the period from 1959–2018 (N = 20). We examine how the Court 
reasons and balances parental and children’s rights, assesses the child’s de 
jure and de facto family life, and determines the child’s best interests in cases 
where the family unit that the child is born into cannot provide for and raise 
the child.
The article is structured in seven parts. The next two sections outline the 
concept of family in theory and jurisprudence, respectively, followed by a pres-
entation of the workings of the Court and a method section. Thereafter, we 
present our findings, discussion and concluding remarks.
2 The Concept of Family in Theory
A simple and direct definition of family, widely used, is that it is a multigen-
erational unit consisting of one or more adults, taking primary custodial 
responsibility for any number of dependent children (Archard, 2010: 9–10). 
Typically, a family will live together and have an intimate and close relation-
ship, but these are not necessary conditions. A necessary condition is that 
The International Journal of Children’s Rights
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this unit must be stable, in the sense that the parent-child relationship needs 
to exist over a presumable substantial period of time. By this definition, tem-
porary foster care, for example, would not be considered family, as it lacks 
permanence being based on a contract, which can be terminated by the state 
or the foster parents (and sometimes the child). In a somewhat different 
approach to defining family, the child-adult relationship is not a necessary 
condition, and the criteria centre around relations and activities instead: 
“people related by marriage, birth, consanguinity or legal adoption, who share 
a common kitchen and financial resources on a regular basis” (Sharma, 2013: 
307). Social work research increasingly tends to define family based on caring 
relationships, placing the focus strictly on function over form: those caring for 
a particular person are considered family, regardless of the presence of a par-
ent-child relationship (Cutas, 2018). The concept of family is also shaped by 
normative assumptions about personal relationships, which is evident from 
the tensions between legal and moral parenthood and the different views on 
what makes a parent or a family.
Importantly, the family is not simply a private realm, but it is also a social 
institution supported by laws. Political theorist John Rawls (2001) considers 
the family to be both private and public, as the family is the basic structure 
of society but simultaneously lies outside this structure. Families are volun-
tary and non-voluntary units that involve both individual and public ends, 
and thus must be both free from state interventions but also require state 
protection of individual members. Feminists, for example, argue that the 
family should be subject to principles of justice, as the state cannot avoid 
interference in families, especially given the state’s critical interest in chil-
dren as future citizens (Satz, 2017). For the purpose of our study, “family” is 
to be considered a two-generation unit, and entails a broad non-contrac-
tual parent-child relation criterion that includes both de jure and de facto 
parents.
3 The Concept of Family in Jurisprudence
Family as a concept, including the right to respect for family life, is present 
in many international human rights instruments (Banda and Eekelaar, 2017). 
There are two main sources of children’s rights for the Member States of the 
Council of Europe: the echr and the crc. Both legal frameworks protect the 
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3.1 Article 8 of the ECHR and the Case Law of Article 8
As one of the two main sources of children’s rights for Member States of the 
Council of Europe, Article 8 of the ECHR states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.
This right, and its limitations, apply to everyone. Although the wording of 
Article 8 may appear straightforward, the nature of the “family” which lies 
at the core of the right to be protected is open to a variety of interpretations 
and has been the subject of much jurisprudence by the ECtHR. This has been 
driven by ongoing social change reflecting the evolving nature of the echr 
(see e.g. Dzehtsiarou, 2011; Lagoutte, 2016; Hodson, 2012).
The ECtHR has established that domestic measures hindering the enjoy-
ment of family life amount to an interference with the right protected by 
Article 8; and that any such state action has to be rooted in national law, must 
be justified for the protection of the health and welfare of the child, and be 
necessary in a democratic society (Directorate of the Jurisconsult, 2019). The 
notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing 
social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued, which in our cases is an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s 
best interests. There is a wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the states, 
and the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities (for 
general principles, see e.g. Kilkelly 2017: 17–31).
The Court analyses the facts of the case in the context of applicable national 
and international legislation such as relevant provisions of the crc and the 
European Convention on the Adoption of Children. Although the Court is 
not formally bound by the provisions of other supranational legal regimes, it 
does refer to them in the context of relevant law. Neither is the Court bound 
by its previous case law but as it elucidates, clarifies, and sometimes develops 
the rights protected by the Convention (see e.g. Zysset 2017: 121–124, 133–138) 
and aims for consistency of practice, it routinely refers to its previous case law 
(Directorate of the Jurisconsult, 2019, paras. 22–24, 242–244). As Wheatle (2017: 
107) observes, the Court has to guarantee interpretative integrity of its practice; 
thus, the practice has to be both backward and forward-looking.
The International Journal of Children’s Rights
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Where a right to respect for family life has been established, the state has an 
obligation to protect it, including through positive measures (e.g. Kilkelly, 2010; 
Rainey, Wicks and Ovey, 2017: 370–374, 376–386). Nevertheless, the parents’ 
right to respect for family life may be overridden by the child’s best interests, 
which may require prioritising the child’s existing or emerging bonds with her 
non-biological family (see Kilkelly, 2017: 159–163 for a general overview of the 
principles relating to family ties; and ECtHR, 2019 April, paras. 299–308 for key 
practice). This means that the Court might establish a violation of the right to 
respect for family life of the parents (and compensate it appropriately), but 
that the state has no obligation to recreate the family life with the biological 
family.3
3.2 The Concept of Family in the crc and in the crc Committee
The crc is the second key source of children’s rights for members of the 
Council of Europe and adds some extra elements to the decision-making pro-
cess. Although the crc does not contain a specific right to respect for family 
life, it is strongly premised on the view that the child’s rights are best secured 
in the context of family life. This much is indicated by preambular paragraph 
6 of the crc which provides:
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the 
natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members 
and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection 
and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the 
community.
This theme of the centrality of the family is supported by the wording of Article 
5, which requires States Parties to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties 
of parents as the latter “provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving 
3 The Court discussed this in Johansen v. Norway (ii) (2002), admissibility decision where 
the mother contested the continuing placement of the child with foster parents even after 
the ECtHR had established a violation of the Convention. The Court pointed out that the 
national County Board correctly, ‘laid stress on the need to secure S.’s position in the foster-home 
environment. In this connection, particular regard was had to her age (then 8) and maturity, the 
fact that she had no social ties with her biological mother and had lived nearly all her life with her 
foster parents, whom she regarded as her own parents, and had developed a particularly strong 
attachment to them. The foster parents had proven themselves suitable carers for S. Removing 
her from the foster-home environment would not only be damaging to her in the short term but 
was also likely to have adverse effects in the long term. Indeed, at that point, the applicant did not 
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capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by 
the child of the rights recognised in the present Convention”. The importance 
of the relationship between children and their parents is further underpinned 
in Articles 7, 8, 18, and 27(2). That familial relationships can be broken is also 
reflected in Articles 9–11 and 20–21, and these articles also highlight the cen-
trality of the role of the state in such situations. These provisions make explicit 
reference to the need for all decision-making to be informed by the child’s best 
interests, a requirement that is further reinforced by the provisions of Article 
3(1) whereby the best interests of the child is to be a primary consideration 
in all decision making regarding the child, and the status of the best interests 
of the child as a guiding principle of the crc (for general principles of the 
crc see e.g. Hanson and Lundy, 2017). Notably, for those States Parties that 
recognise and/or permit the system of adoption, Article 21 requires that such 
States “shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration”.4 In essence, it means that if there is a need to balance the dif-
ferent rights, the best interests of the child should prevail (van Bueren, 2007; 
Eekelaar, 2015; cf. Reece, 1996).
Broadly speaking, the crc’s provisions regarding the child’s right to respect 
for family life mirror the interpretation of the right to respect for family life in 
Article 8(1) echr, in that children ought to be cared for within a family envi-
ronment. With regard to adoption, the right of the child to family life has been 
considered in a number of General Comments of the Committee of the crc, 
which – although non-binding, are authoritative interpretations – strongly 
reaffirm the requirement to consider the best interests of the child (crc, 
2013: para. 29). In the situation of adoptions, this principle must be the “para-
mount” consideration (crc 2013, para. 38). The issue of adoption has also been 
mentioned in other General Comments that have been released by the crc 
Committee, such as the one on the implementation and protection of rights in 
early childhood (crc, 2005: para 36(b)), as well as in a Joint General Comment 
(crc cmw, 2017: para. 32(e)). Elements of these General Comments are also 
significant because of their emphasis on obtaining the views of the child in 
determining the child’s best interests (crc, 2005: para. 36(b); crc, 2009: paras. 
32–33, 56; crc, 2016: para. 39). This emphasis placed on the child’s views in 
determining the best interests of the child, marks a difference between the 
approaches of the crc and the ECtHR in decisions regarding family care, alter-
native care and adoption.
4 Sloan (2013) discusses the implementation of the crc in the field of adoption law in UK, 
and argues that there are difficulties with the notion of “paramountcy” of the best interest 
principle.
The International Journal of Children’s Rights
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3.3 Congruence between the ECtHR and the Committee of the crc
Despite a degree of congruence between the ECtHR and the Committee 
of the crc, it should be noted from the outset that, as a matter of interna-
tional law, neither legal regime is bound by the other. Although the ECtHR 
is not obliged directly to use the crc or its interpretive documents as its 
main source for decision making, it is helpful to consider how the principle 
of the child’s best interests is understood within the framework of the crc. 
In terms of the actual relationship between the two legal regimes, empiri-
cally, an analysis of all child protection care order cases decided by the Court 
from 1959-April 2016, show that the crc is rarely mentioned by the Court 
(Helland, 2019).5
The crc Committee has addressed the lack of common understanding of 
the best interests principle (crc General Comment No. 14, 2013), listing seven 
elements that should be considered when a decision about the child’s best 
interests is to be made (7ff.): (a) the child’s views; (b) the child’s identity; (c) 
preservation of the family environment and maintaining relations; (d) care, 
protection, and safety of the child; (e) situation of vulnerability; (f) the child’s 
right to health, and (g) the child’s right to education. Each of these elements 
is laid out in detail in the Comment and should provide clear instructions 
for decision makers across countries. However, because this principle covers 
all aspects of a child’s life, the comment also underscores that the principle 
remains ambiguous, and that ‘(t)he content of each element will necessarily 
vary from child to child and from case to case, depending on the type of deci-
sion and the concrete circumstances, as will the importance of each element 
in the overall assessment.’ (9). A study of the child’s best interests principle in 
child protection legislation of 14 western countries reveals that prominent fac-
tors in legislation are: the child’s views; the preservation of the family environ-
ment and maintaining relations; care, protection and safety of the child, and a 
situation of vulnerability. However, the child’s identity and the child’s rights to 
health and to education are only mentioned by a few countries (Skivenes and 
Sørsdal, 2018).
It is also worth noting that a review of the Concluding Observations made 
by the crc Committee in relation to the six countries that feature in our 
analysis show that the crc Committee has expressed concern at the man-
ner in which those six countries have applied this standard in the context 
5 In the Court’s life span up till 2016, there have been decided 44 cases involving child protection 
care orders, the first decided in 1987 (Helland, 2019), and the first time the crc was mentioned 
by the Court in these 44 judgments was in 1996, and in total the crc has been mentioned in 
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of situations of alternative care.6 This is relevant to the present context of 
adoptions from care, which are typically preceded by such alternative care 
arrangements.
4 Method and Data Material
We analyse all judgments that concern an adoption from care decided by the 
Court from its start in 1959 until the end of December 2018. We have used the 
hudoc database that contains all the judgments, decisions and resolutions 
made by the ECtHR. We have selected the English language judgments that 
were decided either by the Grand Chamber or the Chamber7 under Article 
8, and that have importance levels “key cases”, 1 or 2. We had the following 
search strategies. First, we searched text strings that included all the following 
words: “child*”; “adopt*”; and “welfare*”. This search resulted in 196 cases (11 
December 2018). Testing for accuracy in our search strategy, we searched for 
references to two cases: “Johansen v. Norway” (resulting in 65 cases) or “Aune v. 
Norway” (resulting in 8 cases), and they were included in the first search and 
thus confirmed the relevance of the search strategy. Second, all 196 cases were 
manually reviewed to identify if they were adoption from care cases. The result 
is a total of 20 cases that deal with termination of parental rights resulting 
in adoption or declaring the child available for adoption. We examined the 
Court’s reasoning in these 20 cases to identify whether the Court emphasised 
the procedural or substantial elements (cf. O’Mahony, 2019) in the best inter-
ests considerations.8 In half of the cases, the Court focused on a procedural 
element of either Article 8 or Article 6 of the echr (e.g. discussing failures to 
involve the applicant sufficiently during the proceedings, the length of judi-
cial proceedings in the national justice system, or inappropriate procedures 
for restricting or terminating access to the child, the procedure of removal, 
or access to the child or adoption). In ten cases, what we label “core cases”, 
6 See the Concluding Observations of the crc Committee: Croatia 1996a, para. 10; Slovenia 
1996b, para. 17; Norway 2000, paras. 34–35; Spain 2002a, paras. 32 and para. 33(a)-(b); UK 
2002b, para. 26; Italy 2003, paras. 33–35; Slovenia 2004a, paras. 34–35; Croatia 2004b, paras. 
42 and 48; Norway 2005, para. 24; Norway 2010a, paras. 34–35; Spain 2010b, para. 27; Italy 2011, 
para. 42(a); Slovenia 2013, paras. 28–29 and 48–49; Croatia 2014, paras. 40(a)-(b) and 41(b); UK 
2016, paras. 52 and 53(b), (c) and (g); Spain 2018a, paras. 27(a)-(b) and 28(a)-(b); and Norway 
2018b, paras. 20–21.
7 This method of selection excludes admissibility decisions that might have relevance for 
defining the protective scope of article 8.
8 We are aware that decisions on best interests are interwoven with the procedural aspects of a 
decision, and thus the distinction we have made may be subject to discussion.
The International Journal of Children’s Rights
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the Court discussed the material scope of Article 8, including themes such as 
the justifications provided for restrictions to/termination of contact, consider-
ations of alternatives to a permanent severing of ties with the biological family 
or the appropriate balancing of parental rights against the best interests of the 
child. For transparency purposes, we provide an Appendix with supplemen-
tary material published online at: https://www.discretion.uib.no/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/Breen-et-al.-Family-life-for-children-in-state-care.pdf.
The 20 cases are as follows, with the 10 core cases emboldened: B. v. The 
United Kingdom (1987); H. v. The United Kingdom (1987); O. v. The United 
Kingdom (1987); R. v. The United Kingdom (1987); W. v. The United Kingdom 
(1987); McMichael v. The United Kingdom (1995); Johansen v. Norway (1996), 
Bronda v. Italy (1998), E.P. v. Italy (1999), P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom 
(2002); X. v. Croatia (2008); Aune v. Norway (2010); R. and H. v. The United 
Kingdom (2011); Y.C. v. The United Kingdom (2012); A.K. and L. v. Croatia (2013); 
R.M.S v. Spain (2013); S.H. v. Italy 2015 (2015); Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017);9 
Hasan v. Norway (2018); S.S. v. Slovenia (2018). In the Appendix, Table 1, we pres-
ent basic key information about these cases.
The analytical approach to the cases was undertaken in several steps; when 
a judgment had a dissenting opinion, we used the reasoning of the majority. 
First, we mapped the factual characteristics of the 20 cases, the decision out-
come, echr violations, family composition, age of the child, etc. Second, we 
analysed the Court’s use of case law in relation to Article 8, echr, and fur-
ther, if the adoption cases made reference to each other (see Tables 2 and 3 
in Appendix). Third, we read the cases with the aim of identifying the main 
themes of the dispute in the context of Article 8 and the crc, and analysed 
the Court’s reasoning, argumentation and understanding in relation to two 
themes: the child’s family life and the child’s best interests. For each theme, 
we examined what standard the Court applies, if and how those standards 
change over time, and how the Court considers the specific circumstances of 
the case. We have emphasised the ten core cases as they include the discus-
sions around material violations of Article 8 (in Appendix, Table 4, there are 
details on substantive consideration by the Court). All four researchers have 
9 10 September 2019 the Grand Chamber judgment, Strand Lobben and others v. Norway 2019, was 
published, replacing the judgment from 2017. In the Grand Chamber judgment, a majority of 
13 judges concluded that Norway had violated the applicants’ right to respect for family life on 
procedural grounds – not on the merits of adoption from care. We do not include this judgment 
in the analysis, because it came this late and furthermore the judgment is on procedural 
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reviewed the judgments, and have coded and recoded themes in the material. 
Any discrepancies in the interpretation of the coding have been thoroughly 
discussed within the team until resolved. Two research assistants have reliabil-
ity-tested the coding.
There are limitations to our approach, as we only base our study on the 
written arguments in the judgments, to the extent that they have been found 
admissible, and analyse the discussion of the merits of the case with regard 
to Article 8. Thus, we do not capture deliberations within the Court, or any 
non-verbal communication or other types of factors that may influence the 
outcome. However, for most of the cases the written material is the only source 
of the decision makers’ reasoning, due to time having passed. In addition, the 
written judgments are the central component of the case law of the Court that 
gives an authoritative interpretation of the echr and is thus binding upon 
the member states. Therefore, judgments represent the material that forms 
and instructs the legal community and member states on how to interpret 
and apply the echr (see e.g. Zysset 2017: 94–96; Rainey, Wicks and Ovey, 2017: 
64–83).
5 Findings
We start with a description of the characteristics of all the adoption cases 
decided by the Court, to provide an informative backdrop to our analysis and 
to bring forward knowledge about state intervention cases that we have very 
little information about in Europe.
5.1 Adoption from Care Case Characteristics
The 20 cases on adoption decided by the Court concern 25 children. In 
16 cases the biological mother was an applicant; sometimes joined by the 
father (1/20 cases) or the biological child who had been removed and placed 
for adoption (2/20 cases). In three cases, the biological father was the 
applicant and in one case maternal grandparents were applicants. All the 
applicants alleged a violation of their Article 8 right. Nine of the cases are 
brought against the UK, four against Norway, three against Italy, two against 
Croatia and one case each against Spain and Slovenia. There were 14 cases 
in which the children were adopted, and six cases in which the adoption 
process was either discontinued (1/20 cases) or pending by the time of the 
ECtHR judgment (5/20 cases). The children were between one and 15 years 
old at the time of adoption (nine unknown), with a median of 5.5 years and 
an average of 5.7 years. At the time of the decision in the Court, the children 
The International Journal of Children’s Rights
10.1163/15718182-28040001 | 
13
The International Journal of Children’s Rights 28 (2020) 1-33
children’s family life in ecthr
were between 4 and 18 years old, with a median of 9 years and an average 
of 9.5 years.
Most cases, as described in the judgments, provide several reasons for the 
necessity of intervention by the child protection authorities. Common issues 
are parental mental health (12/20 cases); general “parenting deficiencies” 
(8/20); parents’ substance misuse (drug, alcohol, medicine) (7/20); domestic 
violence (5/20); and housing issues (5/20). In eight cases, there are various 
direct or indirect problematic issues that are typically not associated with good 
parenting capabilities, including previous mistreatment of children, a chaotic 
lifestyle, and violent criminal behaviour.
The Court was composed of 7 judges in 12 cases. In another 5 cases, the 
Court consisted of 17 judges, and 9 judges in the remaining three cases. In 
12 out of the 20 cases, the Court concluded that there had been a violation 
of Article 8, with four of these decisions having dissenting minority opin-
ions. Of the eight cases, where the Court did not find a violation of Article 
8, four had a dissenting minority. Cases with violations of Article 8 con-
cerned most often procedural issues (eight of the ten cases), whereas for 
the core cases there are four out of ten cases concluding on a breach. The 
crc is mentioned in the Court’s argumentation in 610 of the 15 judgments 
(not including judgments decided before 1989), the first time in 1996 (in 
Johansen v. Norway).
We examined how the 20 adoption judgments referenced each other (cf 
Olsen and Küçüksu, 2017; Helland, 2019), and four judgments stand out as 
establishing important principles in child protection and adoptions: Johansen 
v. Norway (1996) is referenced in 92 per cent of the subsequent judgments, R. H. 
v. UK (2011) is referenced in 71 per cent, Y.C. v. UK (2012) is referenced in 67 per 
cent, and Aune v. Norway (2010) is referenced in 63 per cent of the subsequent 
judgments (see Table 2 in the Appendix for a detailed overview).
The ten core judgments in which the Court considers substantively the 
material conditions of adoption have some key characteristics (see Table 1). 
We find that they are all relatively new, with eight of the ten cases decided 
from 2010 and onward, and only two from the 1990’s (1996 and 1999). Johansen 
v. Norway (1996) sets the scene and standards for all the coming assess-
ments of the Court in cases of child protection and adoption from care11 
10 Johansen v. Norway (1996), para. 76; X v. Croatia (2008), para. 23; A. K. and L. v. Croatia (2013), 
para. 34; Strand Lobben v. Norway (2018), paras. 70, 74–75; Hasan v. Norway (2018), paras. 108, 
118; S. S. v. Slovenia (2018), paras. 51, 63.
11 Although, Simmonds (2012), amongst other, raises doubts as to whether Johansen v. Norway 
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(see Table 3 in the Appendix for references between the ten judgments). In all 
of the ten core cases, the birth parent(s) complained about the adoption order 
and in six cases they also disputed contact arrangements. In four cases, there 
was also a complaint on the lack of reunification efforts. A breach of Article 8, 
echr was found in four cases (one of them with a dissenting opinion), and in 
two of the cases the Court criticised the states (R.M.S. v. Spain (2013) and S.H. 
v. Italy (2015)) for violating the “least intrusive means” principle, as the state 
could initially have done more to keep the family together. The other six cases 
were concluded not to violate Article 8 (of which three cases had dissent-
ing opinions). The Court follows the logic of the national procedures start-
ing with the first involvement of the child protection system: the child being 
taken into public care with visitation/access arrangements between child 
and parents; adoption proceedings are initiated and the child is adopted (or 
declared available for adoption). The cases differ in the precise point where 
the alleged violation of the biological parent’s family life took place and the 
way that the violation happened. Each of these stages are together and sep-
arately considered an interference with the family life of both the child and 
the biological parents. In three of the cases, E.P. v. Italy (1999), R.M.S. v. Spain 
(2013) and S. H. v. Italy (2015), the main focus was on the first interventions 
by the state. The Court concluded in these cases that the states had not done 
enough: services and support could have been provided and contact could 
have been maintained. The applications in all judgments were submitted by 
the biological parent(s), and only in S. S. v. Slovenia (2018) adoptive parents 
intervened as third parties. The latter may indicate a broader perspective on 
family relations in the Court.
table 1 Complaints, issues discussed and outcomes in ten core cases
Applicant, state and year Least 
Intrusive 
Measures
Re-Unification Contact Adoption Violation 
Of Art 8
Johansen v. Norway (1996)   X X Yes (8:1)
E. P v. Italy (1999)  X X X Yes (6:1)
Aune v. Norway (2010)   X X No (7:0)
R and H v. UK (2011)   X X No (6:1)
Y. C. v. UK (2012)  X  X No (6:1)
R. M. S. v. Spain (2013) X X X X Yes (7:0)
S. H. v. Italy (2015) X X X X Yes (7:0)
Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017)    X No (4:3)
Hasan v. Norway (2018)    X No (7:0)
S. S. v. Slovenia (2018)    X No (7:0)
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In examining if and how the Court discusses and provides reasoning relat-
ing to “family life” for the involved children, and how the Court considers the 
child’s best interests, in the ten core cases, a leading question is how the Court 
reasons around de jure and de facto family relations. In all the ten core cases, 
the Court first outlines the platform for the analysis – the basic criteria and 
case law for Article 8. The Johansen v. Norway (1996) judgment states the basic 
standard for an intervention, which is quoted or referred to in seven out of 
ten judgments:12
‘Such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and 
could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding require-
ment pertaining to the child’s best interests’ (para. 78).
Subsequent cases elaborate on the types of circumstances that are “exceptional” 
and the requirements that are “overriding”, so that the initial family unit may be 
permanently dissolved, leading to the termination of rights flowing from that 
unit, as courses of action that are in the child’s best interests. The findings from 
the Court’s reasoning in each of the ten core cases presented in the following, in 
chronological order, see also Table 2.
Johansen v. Norway (1996) concerns a girl who shortly after birth was taken 
into care by the child protection authorities due to the mother’s poor physical 
and mental health and an incapability to care for the baby. The girl was later 
adopted. The Court finds the care order necessary, but concludes (8:1) that con-
tact arrangements and adoption constituted a violation of Article 8. In this 
case, the Court considers Article 8 also to include the child. Here, the child’s 
best interests considerations concerned the child’s developmental needs and 
the Court also comments on the advantages of an adoption:
it was crucial that she live under secure and emotionally stable condi-
tions. The Court sees no reason to doubt that the care in the foster home 
had better prospects of success if the placement was made with a view to 
adoption (para. 80).
12 The exceptions are E. P. v. Italy (1999) which instead make reference to the standard of 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ (para. 61); R. M. S. v. Spain (2013) that refer to the standard 
to, ‘ensure compliance with the positive obligations imposed on it under Article 8 of the 
Convention’ (para. 5); and, S. S. v. Slovenia (2018) that refers to the standard of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ (para. 96), but do not connect this to the best interests principle or make 
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The Court also considers the fact that the mother was not being receptive to 
treatment, and feared that she might take her daughter away. In the Court 
statements on family life, it is the mother’s family life that is explicitly men-
tioned but the simultaneous violation of the child’s right to respect for family 
life (with her mother) is not a focus in the Court’s formulation of family life.
The E.P. v. Italy (1999) case concerns a girl who at about age five was 
removed from her mother by the child protection authorities due to the 
mother’s mental health problems and her seemingly obsessive focus on the 
child’s health. The mother and the child were not allowed any contact after 
the removal, and the girl was freed for adoption. The Court only briefly con-
siders the best interests of the child, as it concludes (6:1) a breach of Article 
8, because mother and child had not had a chance to re-establish their bonds 
and this was not a fair balance between the best interests of the child and the 
mother’s Article 8 rights.
Aune v. Norway (2010) is a case about a boy who was removed from his parents 
at age six months, due to abuse and his parents’ serious drug problems. The boy 
was later adopted. When the Court assesses if an adoption was anchored in his 
best interests, it considers three factors: first, that the mother had created great 
disturbances around the boy’s placement. Second, that the boy is particularly 
vulnerable and in need of security. Third, that contact between the birth family 
and the boy would continue after an adoption. In this case, the child’s view is 
mentioned, as the Court saw, ‘no reason to doubt that the impugned measures 
corresponded to A’s wishes’ (para. 72). The Court unanimously concluded that 
there had not been a breach of Article 8.
R. and H. v. UK (2011) related to a girl who was taken into care by the child 
protection authorities in Northern Ireland, due to the mother’s alcohol mis-
use and mental health problems. The child was adopted at a later stage, which 
started with an order that freed the child for adoption. In the best interests 
analysis, the Court considers the timescale for the parents to deal with their 
alcohol problem and, being mindful of the possibility of a relapse, notices 
that ‘(a)ny such relapse would be “catastrophic” for N (child)’ (para. 85). It also 
addresses if post-adoption contact should be a requirement, and concludes 
that both these factors had to give way to the child’s interest in having the 
opportunity to be adopted. In the Court’s discussion of family life, the Court is 
explicit that it is the ‘protection of the rights of parents and children to respect 
for their family life’ (para. 81). In this case, the Court points to the individuality 
of children in the same family, stating that
‘the needs and interests of children, even children in the same family, 
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entitled to make different decisions as to the care of all the children con-
cerned in this case, and to find that that N’s age meant that adoption was 
in her best interests’ (para. 86).
Also interesting is that in this case, the Court concurs with the state’s argument 
that it is inconsiderate of the parents not to consent to adoption when that is 
clearly in the best interests of the child. Finally, the Court explicitly mentions 
the child’s de facto family situation:
‘when a considerable period of time has passed since a child was origi-
nally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his or her 
de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the 
parents to have their family reunited …’ (para. 88).
The Court concludes (6:1) that there was no breach of Article 8.
Y. C. v. UK (2012) is a case about a boy who was seven years old when he was 
first removed from his parents due to the parents’ misuse of alcohol, domestic 
violence and parental incapacities. The Court, for the first time, stated explicitly 
the factors that must be assessed when considering the child’s best interests:
The identification of the child’s best interests and the assessment of the 
overall proportionality of any given measure will require courts to weigh a 
number of factors in the balance. The Court has not previously set out an ex-
haustive list of such factors, which may vary depending on the circumstanc-
es of the case in question. However, it observes that the considerations listed 
in section 1 of the 2002 Act [Adoption and Children Act 2002] … broadly 
reflect the various elements inherent in assessing the necessity under Article 
8 of a measure placing a child for adoption. In particular, it considers that in 
seeking to identify the best interests of a child and in assessing the necessity 
of any proposed measure in the context of placement proceedings, the do-
mestic court must demonstrate that it has had regard to, inter alia, the age, 
maturity and ascertained wishes of the child, the likely effect on the child of 
ceasing to be a member of his original family and the relationship the child 
has with relatives (para. 135) (authors’ insertion in brackets).
The Court considers the timescale and the request for further assessment of 
parental capacities, and notes that this ‘… would entail a degree of disruption to 
K.’s foster placement and a risk of emotional harm…’ (para. 145). Another factor 
that is mentioned is the parents’ lack of engagement with support and services. 
The Court concludes (6:1) that there was not a breach of Article 8 in this case.
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R. M. S. v. Spain (2013) concerns a girl who was under the age of four when 
the child protection authority removed her from her mother. The Court’s 
assessment and considerations focus on the initial proceedings and the lack of 
reasoning and examination by the public authorities. The Court’s discussion of 
the interests of the child stresses the lack of evidence and examination of the 
child’s situation:
‘the decision in question should have been followed swiftly by appropri-
ate measures to examine in depth the child’s situation and her relation-
ship with her parents’ (para. 83).
The Court emphasises the age of the child as a factor that makes the intrusive 
intervention especially serious, and the Court is not persuaded by the Spanish 
authorities’ descriptions of the relationship between mother and child and the 
behaviour of the mother and the conclusions drawn by the decision makers:
The Court notes that no consideration was given at any stage of the ad-
ministrative procedure to the fact that the child had been very young 
when she was separated from her mother, to the existing emotion-
al bond between mother and child or to the length of time that had 
elapsed since their separation and the attendant consequences for both 
of them (para. 83).
The Court found unanimously a violation of Article 8.
S. H. v. Italy (2015) is a case about a girl who was four at the time of the 
removal from her mother by the Italian authority. There were concerns about 
the mother’s mental health, and several accidental ingestions of medication 
by the child that resulted in hospitalisations. The Court found a violation of 
Article 8 in this case (6:1), and Article 8 included also the child. In the dis-
cussion of the girl’s best interests, the Court criticises the lack of support and 
problem-solving by the child protection system. This resulted in ‘insufficient 
effort to safeguard the bond between the mother and the children’ (para. 52). 
The Court is clear that programmes of social assistance were available which 
‘would have preserved the family bond while also protecting the children’s 
best interests’ (para. 52). The Court discusses the family life of the child 
solely in relation to the birth family, and there is no mentioning of the child’s 
de facto situation or discussion of other best interests considerations such as 
the child’s needs or attachment to her mother or other important persons.
The Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017) case concerns a boy who was a new-
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authorities due to concerns about the mother’s caring abilities. The Court has 
an extensive discussion on the child’s best interests and family life. First, with 
reference to crc General Comment No. 7 (2005), the Court finds that it is 
particularly important to secure the rights of a child of a young age. Second, 
the boy’s particular care needs are vital:
‘…clearly guided by the interests of X (child), notably his particular need 
for security in his foster-home environment, given his psychological vul-
nerability’ (para. 129).
Third, the Court acknowledges that while the removal of the child was within 
the state’s margin of appreciation, the best interests assessment ‘must in the 
present case be carried out taking account of the alternatives that lay in con-
tinued foster care’ (para. 121). This is the first of the current cases in which 
the Court explicitly uses this platform as a departure point. Fourth, the Court 
points to the relations between child and parent when in contact:
‘Taking also into account the City Court’s conclusion that there had been 
no positive development in the first applicant’s competence in contact 
situations throughout the three years in which she had had rights of ac-
cess’ (para. 129).
Fifth, in connection with the protection of the child’s family life, the Court 
emphasised several times that the de facto family situation is important and 
must be protected. The Court concluded (4:3) that there was no breach of 
Article 8.
Hasan v. Norway (2018) concerns two sisters who were removed from their 
family by the child protection system at age one (during the first removal) and 
as a baby, respectively. The reason for the intervention was severe family vio-
lence, with the mother fleeing to a rescue centre, threats by the father and the 
abduction of the children and threats of violence by the father’s family. In this 
case, the Court has an extensive discussion of the case law criteria for violation 
of Article 8 in relation to the child’s best interests:
‘Where children are involved, their best interests must be taken into 
account. The Court reiterates that there is a broad consensus, including 
in international law, in support of the idea that in all decisions con-
cerning children, their best interests are of paramount importance … ’ 
(para. 149).
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Furthermore, the Court analyses balancing between the birth family and the 
de facto family situation of the child:
‘The best interests of the child dictate … that the child’s ties with its 
family must be maintained, … When a “considerable period of time” has 
passed since the child was first placed in care, the child’s interest in not 
undergoing further de facto changes to its family situation may prevail 
over the parents’ interest in seeing the family reunited…’ (para. 150).
The Court emphasises in its consideration of the best interests of the children, 
first, that the children do not have an attachment to their mother, and that 
their attachment to the foster parents was so strong that it would be harmful 
to remove them. Second, the Court draws attention to the children’s need for 
protection from being abducted, that they were vulnerable, and that there had 
been considerations in relation to each individual child needs. Third, the Court 
also makes a statement in relation to adoption:
‘Replacing the children’s legal ties to the applicant with legal ties to the 
adoptive parents thus served to consolidate their de facto family ties. The 
Court has previously held that where social ties between a parent and his 
or her children have been very limited, “(t)his must have implications for 
the degree of protection that ought to be afforded to (the parent’s) right 
to respect for family life under paragraph 1 of Article 8 when assessing the 
necessity of the interference under paragraph 2”’ (para. 161).
The Court concludes unanimously that there was no breach of Article 8.
S. S. v. Slovenia (2018) concerns a girl who was removed by the child pro-
tection authorities when she was one month old. The reason for concern was 
the mother’s mental health problems and abandonment of the girl. The Court 
lays out the various criteria, and includes a reference to the child’s interest in 
maintaining the present family situation and relates this directly to adoption: 
‘Equally, when a considerable period of time has passed since a child 
was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have 
his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the in-
terests of the parents to have their family reunited … Thus, in the field 
of adoption, the Court had already accepted that it may be in the child’s 
interest to promote the process of establishing bonds with his or her 
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The Court concludes unanimously that there was no breach of Article 8.
In the best interests assessment, the Court points out, first, that the child 
and the mother lacked an emotional connection between them, and, second, 
that contact sessions had a negative impact on the child. Third, an interest-
ing statement from the Court is that even when there are some prospects for 
reunification, the interests of the child may override this possibility, and the 
Court points out the balancing between keeping legal ties versus the child’s 
need to be fully integrated into her de facto family:
Even in a situation where reunification might be possible at some point 
in the future, the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family 
situation changed after a considerable period of time may override the 
interests of the parents in having their family reunited … By the same 
token, in view of there being little or no prospect of the biological fam-
ily’s reunification, the Court considers that E.’s [child] interest in fully 
integrating into her de facto family weighed particularly heavily in the 
balance when assessed against the applicant’s wish to retain legal ties 
with her (para. 101).
In Table 2 we have summarised the findings from the ten core cases, and for 
transparency reasons we have done the same for all adoption cases (n = 20) in 
Table 4 in Appendix.
6 Discussion
As an initial and general observation, our findings suggest that the Court 
regards children as objects rather than subjects and that consideration of 
“family life” is limited to the rights of parents. However, some important 
developments are emerging, seemingly taking the Court in a child centric 
direction. Traditionally, the cases arise from disputes that are centrally about 
children but the disputes themselves are played out between biological par-
ents and the state. In child removal and adoption cases, the best interests of 
the child principle serves to limit the right to respect for family life contained 
in Article 8(1) but the question remains as to whether such interference – 
and thus indirectly the standard of the best interests of the child as a limi-
tation on other (predominantly biological) family members’ right to respect 
for family life – is justified (i.e. “necessary in a democratic society”) under 
Article 8(2). This situation also raises the question of whether the standard of 
the best interests of the child also serves to create and/or protect new familial 
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(and, in the context of this article, non-biological) relationships, i.e. that the 
child’s de facto family situation is secured by de jure bonds. Our analysis of 
the Court´s judgments identifies some further, more nuanced, developments 
that have taken place.
6.1 Child Centric Developments in Article 8 Jurisprudence
First, there appears to be a tendency to give increasing focus to the child’s 
perspective in these cases. This is evidenced by the following three factors: 
the Court opens up for describing the breach of family bonds concerning 
both the parents and the child when referring to Article 8 echr (Johansen 
v. Norway (1996); R. and H. v. UK (2011); S. H. v. Italy (2015)). This may be 
an indication that the Court recognises that children and their rights are 
protected by the echr. Furthermore, the standard of the child’s best inter-
ests being paramount is mentioned in five of the judgments, thus explicitly 
drawing attention to the higher standard applicable in cases of adoption 
(Zermatten, 2010). Finally, the Court underscores the importance of assess-
ments of the individual child’s needs and interests in three cases (Aune v. 
Norway (2010), Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017), S. S. v. Slovenia (2018)), as 
opposed to an assessment of the general child.13  This includes the Court 
being explicit that children in the same circumstances, e.g. being siblings, 
have different needs and interests. In conjunction with these developments, 
there is an increase in references to the crc in the core judgments (four 
cases), and this is particularly evident in the Court’s three latest judgments.
Second, the Court has gone beyond recognising de jure family as the “only” 
family unit that is protected by Article 8, and the child’s de facto family situ-
ation is introduced as a standard and explicit consideration: First in R. and 
H. v. UK (2011), thereafter in Y. C. v. UK (2012), and is also referred to several 
times in all the three last cases from 2017–18. Even though the Court has 
recognised protection afforded to the de facto family in its previous case law 
as a tool for accepting different types of family units (O’Mahony, 2012), sub-
stantive focus on the de facto relations of the child has been narrow (Kilkelly, 
2017: 159). Unlike other types of cases, adoption disputes include at least two 
family units that potentially deserve protection under Article 8. Focus on 
the de facto family is an important change in the Court’s focus, signifying 
that the child’s (and foster parents’) family life is of significance and impor-
tant to protect. The Court explicitly mentions the combination of de jure 
13 In Grand Chamber judgment Strand Lobben and others v. Norway, the majority of 13 
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and de facto family in the latest judgment (S. S. v. Slovenia (2018)), stating 
that for a child being integrated into the de facto family weighed particu-
larly heavily when balanced with the biological parent’s wish to retain legal 
ties. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges the value of securing a de facto 
placement with de jure bonds, and that the alternative in these cases is not 
birth family versus adoptive parents, but foster home versus adoptive family 
(Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017)). The latter development also impacts on 
the earlier understanding of the principle that all state interventions into the 
family should be temporary. The Court now recognises that placements of 
children may become permanent, where this is in the child’s best interests. 
Furthermore, and as stated in S. S. v. Slovenia (2018), even when reunifica-
tion may be a possibility in the future, where the child’s interests are best 
served by a permanent placement with her de facto family, considerations 
of the benefits of more immediate permanency can override this considera-
tion, which may be a longer-term outcome; a conclusion that features in the 
remaining developments that we identify.
Third, the Court acknowledges explicitly in six of the judgments (Johansen v. 
Norway (1996), Aune v. Norway (2010), R. and H. v. UK (2011), S. H. v. Italy (2015), 
Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017), and Hasan v. Norway (2018)) that adoption is a 
measure that in general has advantages, e.g. ‘…placement was more likely to be 
successful if the child was adopted by the foster parents’ (Johansen 1996, para. 
77). The Court also includes the advantages of adoption for the foster parents, 
as in Hasan v. Norway (2018):
As regards the authorisation of adoption, the Court further notes that the 
City Court based its decision on how adoption offered many advantages 
compared with placement in a permanent foster home, particularly in 
the form of a higher degree of security, both for the foster parents and for 
the children (para. 157).
Fourth, is the time factor, closely connected to the child’s need for stability 
(Kilkelly, 2017: 353). Time is a critical element in the Court’s assessment of 
attachment of the child and the child’s interest in preserving the de facto fam-
ily situation, as is emphasised in R. and H. v. UK (2011). “Considerable time” 
is the term used, and in Strand Lobben v. Norway (2017), three years and six 
months is regarded as considerable time. Later, in Hasan v. Norway (2018), con-
siderable time is three years and three months.
Clearly, the material from which to draw conclusions is still too sparse, but 
the tendencies we have detected in which the Court identifies factors that are 
directly related to the child’s de facto family situation are noticeable.
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6.2 Article 8, Jurisprudential Developments Regarding the Child’s Best 
Interests
On the substantive or material understanding of the child’s best interests 
standard, a standard that all cases refer to, we identify five factors that the 
Court pays attention to in the adoption cases.
First, the child’s relations and attachment to foster/adoptive family is a con-
sideration, and the Court mentions this in six cases (Johansen v. Norway (1996); 
Aune v. Norway (2010); Y. C. v. UK (2012); R. M. S. v. Spain (2013); Strand Lobben 
v. Norway (2017); Hasan v. Norway (2018)). In the three last cases, the Court 
mentions the positive and strong relationship between the child and foster 
parents. The Court has also recognised that the child’s integration into the new 
family and relationship with her adoptive parents can serve to ameliorate the 
harm previously suffered by the child, as well as the potential harm that might 
accrue to the child should the new relationship be broken (cf. Kilkelly, 2017 on 
other types of adoption judgments).
Second, the child’s lack of relation to birth parents is mentioned as a fac-
tor in support of adoption; the presence or absence of such a relationship 
has been measured in terms of the number and success of contact sessions 
and meetings. It is clear that in eight of the cases, the bonds between birth 
parents and child are weak or non-existing. For three of these cases (E. P. v. 
Italy (1999), R. M. S. v. Spain (2013), S. H. v. Italy (2015)), the ECtHR criticised 
the respective governments for being responsible for the breach of the rela-
tionship between child and parent, whereas in the remaining cases, the lack 
of relationship between birth parent and child is mentioned as a ground for 
adoption.
Third, and related to the above point, the Court has taken into account the 
parents’ willingness to engage in services, to use support and take on advice to 
improve their situation in six cases. In one case, the Court discusses the failure 
of the state to provide appropriate services for the parent. A further factor con-
sidered are the will and capabilities of parents to learn and improve in relation 
to establishing or maintaining bonds with their child.
Fourth, the Court appears to recognise the specific child’s vulnerability and 
needs and interests as dependent on age, previous experiences and personality. 
This is evident in four cases, and here in particular, the child’s need for security 
and permanency seem to be important considerations, which should be seen 
in relation to the previous turbulence in the child’s life due to neglect and/or 
abuse, but also the mere fact that the child has already experienced a child pro-
tection removal, and thus a break in relations and change in living situation.
Fifth, contact after adoption is a consideration that is mentioned by the 
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for the child both in terms of the contact with birth family for the child’s iden-
tity and self-understanding, but also as an indication of the foster/adoptive 
parents’ abilities to care for the child in his/her best interests.
However, although the child’s best interests may be at the core of the 
decision-making, one feature that is lacking in much of the Court’s jurispru-
dence is the incorporation of the child’s views of what is in her best inter-
ests, or indeed the general absence of independent representation for the 
child in such matters. As such, only two of the ten core adoption cases make 
explicit reference to the child’s views and opinions (Y. C. v. UK (2012) and 
Aune v. Norway (2010)). This potential oversight reflects in many ways the 
broader questions about the application of children’s rights and their exer-
cise by children themselves. These questions are important because in many 
countries’ child protection legislation, the opinion of the child is an essen-
tial component for defining the child’s best interests (Skivenes and Sørsdal, 
2018), a point that underpins the views of the crc Committee as developed 
in its General Comment No. 14 on the interpretation of the child’s best inter-
ests principle.
7 Concluding Remarks
One of the aims of this paper was to discover how the Court understands “fam-
ily unit” and the ensuing “family life”, and what set of familial circumstances 
can allow for the justifiable interference with the right to respect for family life 
under Article 8, echr. The question of the family unit’s ability – or inability – 
to provide an adequate level of family life is typically measured in terms of the 
child’s best interests that may justify such intervention. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand what the Court means by a “family unit” and the “child’s 
best interests”, because this meaning influences the interpretation of family 
life and the child’s best interests.
Our analysis is particularly novel as it adds to the current and extensive 
body of case law and corresponding scholarly analysis on the topic of the best 
interests standard and the right to respect for family life by demonstrating how 
the child’s best interests standard is used by the Court as a legal mechanism 
to assess the actions of states’ decisions to break and recreate family units. In 
short, our research reveals what kind of “family unit” the ECtHR considers is 
in the child’s best interests to dissolve. The data in Table 1 of the Appendix 
provides a “factual snapshot” of the characteristics of the children and their 
family units that were the subject of adoption from care orders, characteristics 
that underpinned the Court’s assessment of whether states’ decision making 
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respected the right to respect for family life. Importantly, our findings also 
add to current understanding of such determinations, as we identify whether 
and to what extent the child’s views (explicitly or implicitly) form part of the 
deliberations of whether it is in the child’s best interests to break and recreate 
family units.
The Court´s understands “family unit” in the context of adoptions from 
care, to mean biological relationships between children and parents but, 
more recently, also between children and foster parents, and to a more limited 
extent in terms of recognition, between siblings themselves. To this extent, our 
findings with regard to the Court’s understanding of family composition are in 
line with the theoretical literature, wherein the concept of family reflects the 
bonds created by personal, caring relationships and activities.
The status and respect of the child’s de facto family life is changing. This 
resonates with a view that children do not only have formal rights but that 
they are recognised as individuals within the family unit that states and 
courts must address directly. Born into a family, a child is born into a pri-
vate, non-public sphere. As the Court’s judgments on adoptions from care so 
blatantly show, this is a sphere that may also be oppressive, dangerous and 
requiring intrusive interventions from the state to protect life and wellbeing 
of individuals. The interesting and paradoxical theme in adoption from care 
cases is that the birth family, both in case law and principles, is regarded as 
the superior family. Even children who will not be reunified with their birth 
parents, and will grow up in public care, do not have the recognition of their 
de facto family by providing them with legal protection of their family life. 
The changes we find in the Court’s view on and understanding of family for 
children entails a recognition and stronger protection of children’s non-bi-
ological and de facto family life. From a state perspective this make sense, 
as the state cannot and should not be a primary parent – that is, having the 
responsibility and joy of the family institution. The development we have 
shown has similarities with the women’s rights movement and the realisa-
tion that families are not only a heaven of love and care, operating under 
other conditions than the State, but also a coercive and neglectful unit, dan-
gerous for the family members.
The analysis indicates some further developments concerning the inter-re-
lationship between the echr and the crc with regard to the best interests 
standard. Although the number of instances in which the Court identifies the 
crc as relevant law is increasing, the Court’s reliance on “best interests” as an 
analytical tool stems from the states’ own domestic legislation, and not as it 
appears in the crc (cf. Tobin, 2013). This raises the question of the relevance 
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relation to the preservation, or otherwise, dissolution of the family unit. Whilst 
the crc, from the perspective of international legal rules, cannot directly 
impact on the interpretation of Article 8 of the echr, a failure to outline the 
crc s approach to the continued care of children by their families, where it 
is in the child’s best interests, cannot be overlooked. States themselves ought 
to be mindful of their binding obligations under the crc to act in the best 
interests of the child, and so their domestic legislation ought to reflect that 
obligation. It is noteworthy that the crc Committee has expressed concern 
in relation to the manner and/or extent to which the six member states our 
study comprises ensure that “the best interests of the child” appropriately 
informs the situation of children in alternative care. As states move to address 
such concerns, it may be that the crc indirectly influences the best interests 
standard that falls to be considered by the ECtHR in later cases. Our study 
provides some insight into the types of factual situations, and thus some con-
crete examples of family units and family life that are not in the child’s best 
interests, a level of detail that has been absent from the crc’s analysis, prior 
to the adoption of its complaints mechanism and which may also provide a 
point of future comparison as the jurisprudence of the complaints mecha-
nism continues to expand and develop.
The private and public nature of the family, regarded as the fundamental 
unit of society with both individual/private and public ends, requires a fine 
balance to be struck between the avoidance of state intervention and the obli-
gation of the state to protect individual members; this need for careful con-
sideration is perhaps nowhere as clearly demonstrated in decision-making as 
where it may result in the involuntary and permanent dissolution of the core 
unit of societal relationships, to facilitate the recreation of a new family unit 
that better serves the interests of the child.
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